Although still in the midst of a civil war, Syria will hold presidential elections on 3 June 2014.This will be a sham election, which will not comply with internationally-recognised standards.
Beshr O/Flickr (CC BY 2.0)
For one, the Supreme Constitutional Court has validated only three candidacy bids out of 24, and the two challengers to President Bashar al-Assad, Maher Hajjar (Aleppo) and Hassan al-Nuri (Damascus), lack the resources and support to offer any serious contest. For another, since the rebels oppose any regime-led process, these elections will only be organised in government-held areas, which represent around 40 per cent of Syrian territory and 60 per cent of the population (it is not yet clear who, if any, of the 2.5 million Syrian refugees and the 6.5 million internally displaced persons will be able to vote.) As a result, Assad will likely be re-elected by a very large majority.
The United Nations says that these elections could undermine peace efforts, while both the United States and the European Union (EU) have labelled the process a ‘parody of democracy’. As such, the election results will not be a reliable measure of support – nor opposition – to Assad inside Syria. However, as the election date approaches, there is a need to take a closer look at who are Assad’s supporters. This is a key factor in explaining why his regime – unlike some other Arab dictators – has remained in power despite the on-going insurgency.
Assad’s supporters fall into four broad categories: the state apparatus (notably the army); religious leaders; minorities; and sectors of the Sunni population, including the merchant class.
The army’s loyalty to Assad currently seems to be watertight. Initial defections have proven insignificant for two main reasons: their limited effect on the cohesion of the army, and the fact that most defectors have been soldiers rather than senior officers. Furthermore, over the last year the army has regained territory, recovering the strategic towns of al-Quseir, Yabroud and Homs, and these victories have re-assured military commanders.
Regime hardliners as well as those holding key positions in the state apparatus also feel comforted by these military successes, and members of the Assad family seem certain to remain loyal to the regime. This applies to Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad, Commander of the Republican Guard (an elite army division that controls Damascus); his cousin Fawwaz al-Assad, leader of the Shabbiha militias that are heavily involved in the repression of protestors; and another cousin Rami Makhlouf, a businessman who controls most of the country’s economic sectors. Outside of the family circle, Assad can also rely on significant state figures such as Sunni Minister of Defence Fahd al-Freij, Alawite Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Ali Ayyoub, and Ali Mamlouk, the Sunni Director of the National Security Bureau.
Assad also has the backing of the country’s main religious leaders. Since the beginning of the Syrian war, he has succeeded in exploiting their opposition to Salafist and Wahhabi groups (which form a sizeable part of the rebel movement). He benefits from implicit support from Syria’s main Christian churches, which fear Islamist violent extremists and intolerance. In addition, Assad can count on the country’s main Sunni leaders and Imams, who reject faith-based violence by Salafist, Wahhabi and other groups. Assad publicly thanked these Imams for their ‘patriotic attitude’ during their last meeting in April 2014.
Most of the country’s main minorities (almost 40 per cent of the population) back Assad (or at least do not oppose him outright). He has the firm backing of his own community, the Alawites (10 per cent of the population). He is also supported by a majority of Christians (15 per cent), while Kurds (10 per cent) and Druze (3 per cent) are split on whether to back Assad or not. Traditionally, Druze strongly support the local government of where they are based, but the brutality of the Syrian regime has caused some of them to reassess their position. Kurds are split between the Democratic Union party, which announced the formation of an autonomous government in three Kurdish towns (Afrin, Qamishli and Malikiyah) following a deal with the regime, and the Kurdish National Council in Syria, an anti-Assad umbrella organisation aligned with the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq.
The political stance of Arab Sunnis (60 per cent of the population) is crucial. Most army defectors, internally displaced persons, refugees and political opponents to the Syrian regime belong to this community. However, some Arab Sunnis still support Assad. Politically speaking, some Sunnis believe he is right in opposing (what they perceive as) foreign agendas that encourage the rise of violent Islamist groups in Syria. Economically speaking, the Sunni community contains many merchants and middle class bourgeois that created their wealth from external trade and local commerce.
Before the uprisings, most of these Sunni merchants were based in Syria’s main towns, Aleppo and Damascus (3 million inhabitants each before the uprisings). Many of them had to flee violence but they now want to go back to a normal life, to preserve their economic interests and properties, with some now believing that Assad is the only political leader that can help them do so. As a recent report on Syria’s war economy from the European Council on Foreign Relations put it: ‘The regime’s ability to secure the ongoing backing of significant parts of the business community has clearly bolstered its position’.
In disputed areas, the belief that Syria would flourish post-Assad seems to be diminishing too. The Free Syrian Army and various Islamist rebel groups have poorly administered the areas under their control, partly because of in-fighting among the insurgents. A tendency to oppress those who challenge their rule has also weakened their image and support. Though elections will not take place in rebel-held zones, based on trends in the rest of the country it is not inconceivable that some Syrians living there might be willing to vote for Assad, mainly because they are tired of war and wish for stability. Most of the international community will (rightly) not recognise the results of this election, but they should not ignore the reality of Assad’s fairly broad-based support.
Barah Mikaïl is senior researcher at FRIDE.