The recent election victory of the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has proffered India a strong central government. By emerging as the largest party in parliament (Lok Sabha) with a simple majority (282 of 543 seats), the BJP has changed the paradigm of Indian politics, ending nearly three decades of bulky coalition governments that hindered governance and service delivery. While domestic issues – in particular kick-starting India’s ailing economy – will be the government’s overriding priority, there is already a noticeably clear focus on foreign affairs.
Narendra Modi/Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
The vectors of Modi’s foreign policy are slowly unravelling, and point towards a shift for India from being a near-pacifist power to an orthodox regional power, from a great nation (with tremendous soft power) to a great power. His first few foreign policy moves are clear indications of what is to come. First, Modi unprecedentedly invited all South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leaders to attend his swearing-in ceremony in a shrewd move to reassure India’s immediate neighbours. For example, bilateral talks were held with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the visit.
Modi’s maiden foreign visit will be to neighbouring Bhutan, and in July, his second foreign visit will be to Japan, a major development partner to India and a country that stood by Modi throughout his ostracism from the West. This underlines the future orientation of India’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific. On 8-9 June India received China’s foreign minister, just a month after the government took power, ensuring that its largest trading partner (country) is simultaneously engaged given the strong reinforcement of Indo-Japan ties.
Meanwhile Modi’s third foreign trip will be to Brasilia for the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit in mid-July, which will reinforce India’s alignment towards the grouping and more South-South cooperation. A summit at the White House with US President Barack Obama has also promptly been scheduled for September, rejecting the advice of many in India’s strategic community who remember the previous American visa ban against the Indian prime minister.
The stark absence of any reference so far to relations with Europe cannot be read as a simple oversight. While relations with some European Union (EU) member states (like Germany, France or the UK) will eventually be picked up by India, faltering relations with the EU look likely to dwindle further. The EU-India relationship has been largely lacklustre for the past few years; for instance, two planned annual summits in 2011 and 2013 did not take place.
The partnership’s single major initiative, a bilateral trade and investment FTA, has been under negotiations for seven years. But with a BJP government in power, it seems doubtful that EU-India FTA talks as they stand now will ever see the light of day. During the previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the BJP championed national opposition to EU-India FTA negotiations citing lack of transparency and an imbalance in favour of the EU. BJP leaders warned of the devastating potential impact of the FTA on poorer sections of society in particular for retailers, farmers and dairy producers.
In power now, the BJP will be unwilling to push through the EU-India FTA to avoid appearing as hypocritical vis-à-vis its supporters and public opinion at large. Plus, a newly elected government with such a challenging domestic agenda will be less likely to pass a major international initiative anytime soon. What appears more probable is a re-negotiation of the FTA, which may further extend the negotiating period by a few years.
That said, the BJP as a political party is not inherently opposed to foster relations with Europe and is genuinely interested in economic development and foreign relations. There is a clear need for redoubled efforts by the EU if it is to salvage its relations with India and engagement must be prioritised urgently. At least one of the EU’s top leaders should visit India once a year. Beyond the planned annual summits, the new high representative and relevant commissioners should make of it a top destination for renewed engagement. For example, the last visit by the EU High Representative to India was in 2012.
Visits between Brussels and Delhi would certainly add impetus to the partnership. As far as the FTA goes, patience will be more than a virtue for the EU. The EU could do well to anticipate renegotiation of certain FTA chapters like agriculture and dairy, intellectual property issues or public procurement to ensure that the deal is not shelved completely. Finally, re-tuning the EU-India agenda to better align with Modi’s own priorities and national agenda could help build synergies. In this regard, boosting cooperation on infrastructure, green energy, new technologies and transport would advance bilateral relations appreciably. Narendra Modi has every intention of putting India at the centre stage of global geopolitics and economics. Befriending the world’s largest democracy would fare well for the EU.
Gauri Khandekar is researcher and Head of Agora Asia Europe Programme at FRIDE.